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Humans are sensitive to the statistical regularities in action sequences carried out by 30 
others. In the current eye-tracking study, we investigated whether this sensitivity can support 31 
prediction of upcoming actions when observing unfamiliar action sequences. In two between-32 
subjects conditions, we examined whether observers would be more sensitive to statistical 33 
regularities in sequences performed by a human agent vs. self-propelled ‘ghost’ events. 34 
Secondly, we investigated whether regularities are better learned when associated with 35 
contingent effects. Both implicit and explicit measures of learning were compared between 36 
agent and ghost conditions. Implicit learning was measured via predictive eye movements to 37 
upcoming actions or events, and explicit learning was measured via uninstructed reproduction 38 
of action sequences and verbal reports of the regularities. Findings revealed that participants, 39 
regardless of condition, readily learned the regularities and made correct predictive eye 40 
movements to upcoming events during online observation.  However, different patterns in 41 
explicit learning outcomes emerged following observation: participants were most likely to 42 
recreate the sequence regularities and to verbally report them when they observed an actor 43 
create a contingent effect. These results suggest that the shift from implicit predictions to 44 
explicit knowledge of what has been learned is facilitated when observers perceive another 45 
agent’s actions and when these actions cause effects. Findings are discussed with respect to 46 
the potential role of the motor system in modulating how statistical regularities are learned 47 
and used to modify behavior. 48 
 49 
Keywords: action prediction, action sequences, statistical learning, implicit and 50 
explicit learning, eye-tracking  51 
 52 
1.0 Introduction 53 
Predicting the behavior of other people is central to social cognition and interaction. 54 
As we observe others, we automatically predict the unfolding movements and future course 55 
of their actions (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). In everyday life, many of the actions we 56 
observe are embedded within continuous, temporal sequences. Imagine the act of baking a 57 
cake: this action is comprised of a continuous stream of individual action steps such as 58 
gathering ingredients, measuring them into bowls, mixing things together, pouring batter into 59 
a tin, and so forth. The ability to anticipate the upcoming events in a sequence is an indicator 60 
that the observer possesses some knowledge of the overarching structure of the global action 61 
and the relations between the individual steps. Perceiving the boundaries of the distinct 62 
elements in a sequence and anticipating what follows is crucial for our cognitive system to 63 
perceive the overarching activity as coherent and meaningful (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). In the 64 
current study, we investigated whether statistical regularities in novel, unfamiliar sequences 65 
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support the ability to generate predictions of future events during observation1. Specifically, 66 
we investigated whether observers make anticipatory gaze fixations to upcoming action 67 
events based on their transitional probabilities alone, and whether they recreate learned 68 
regularities in their own action performance following observation.  69 
1.1 Statistical learning in the domain of action 70 
Statistical learning (SL) refers to the ability to detect regularities from structured input 71 
and operates across sensory domains (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Krogh, Vlach, & 72 
Johnson, 2013). From early in life, humans are sensitive to multiple sources of statistical 73 
information in visual and auditory stimuli (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999). 74 
Converging evidence indicates that SL skills are rapid and automatic, often occurring without 75 
the learner being consciously aware that he or she has learned anything at all (Turk-Browne, 76 
Scholl, Chun, & Johnson, 2008). This has led to the assumption that SL is a domain-general 77 
mechanism, with similar underlying computations and outcomes across sensory modalities. 78 
However, there is also evidence that the outcomes of SL are specific to the modality in which 79 
the stimuli are learned. For instance, one study (Conway & Christiansen, 2006) presented 80 
participants with auditory, tactile, and visual sequences defined by respective artificial 81 
grammars. Findings showed that sensitivity to statistical features was specific to each sensory 82 
modality, suggesting that SL involves “distributed, modality-constrained subsystems” 83 
(Conway & Christiansen, 2006; p.911).  84 
Does sensitivity to statistical regularities extend to the domain of action? If so, does 85 
SL operate in a domain-general manner across all forms of perceptual events, or are there 86 
specialized subsystems that might facilitate SL particularly for observed actions? An initial 87 
study on action sequence processing by Baldwin and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that 88 
                                                          
1 Unlike the cake example above, the sequences used in the current study were abstract in the sense that they did 
not lead to a global action goal. This was to ensure that predictions could only be based on acquiring knowledge 
of the sequence regularities rather than prior knowledge about the overarching event structure. 
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observers can rely on statistical regularities to segment action streams into discrete steps, 89 
even when transitional probabilities are the only information available for identifying action 90 
segments. At a group level, participants’ performance on this action segmentation task was 91 
comparable with performance on similar tasks in the language domain. Developmental 92 
research has demonstrated similar findings with preverbal infants (Roseberry, Richie, Hirsh-93 
Pasek, Golinkoff, & Shipley, 2011; Saylor, Baldwin, Baird, & LaBounty, 2007; Stahl, 94 
Romberg, Roseberry, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2014), showing that these segmentation 95 
skills emerge early in development. Similarity in performance across studies has led 96 
researchers to speculate that a common “statistical tracking mechanism” (Baldwin, 97 
Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008, p. 1404) is shared between processing of action and 98 
processing of other forms of perceptual stimuli.  99 
Segmentation reveals whether observers demonstrate sensitivity to the sequence 100 
structure after learning has occurred. Typical paradigms measure segmentation by the ability 101 
to remember the items they had observed during a previous learning phase (e.g., Baldwin et 102 
al., 2008; Saffran et al., 1997). However, current theories of action perception claim that 103 
continual, automatic prediction of upcoming actions is a central feature of action processing 104 
(Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a, 2007b). Importantly, predicting the outcomes of ongoing 105 
actions requires integrating prior knowledge about the most likely outcomes of the action 106 
with incoming perceptual input. Though active motor experiences are one important source 107 
of action knowledge (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Libertus 108 
& Needham, 2010; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005), motor experience alone is 109 
insufficient to explain the full range of infant and adults’ capabilities for learning about 110 
actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Statistical learning skills are therefore a candidate 111 
mechanism for how humans learn and generate predictions about upcoming action steps 112 
when observing novel, unfamiliar sequences (Ahlheim, Stadler, & Schubotz, 2014), though 113 
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direct evidence for this does not yet exist. As we discuss below, we hypothesized that 114 
observing human action engages specialized cognitive processes that particularly facilitate 115 
learning of observed action sequences, relative to visual event sequences. 116 
1.2 Outcomes of learning: implicit and explicit measures 117 
The outcomes of SL have long been a topic of debate; in particular, discussions focus 118 
on whether and under what conditions SL results in explicit or implicit learning outcomes 119 
(Perruchet & Pacton, 2006). Typical findings have shown that SL usually occurs 120 
automatically and without conscious intent; people are often unaware of the regularities they 121 
have learned (e.g., Haider et al., 2014; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005; Turk-Browne et 122 
al., 2008). Behavioral indicators of implicit learning are typically revealed in faster reaction 123 
times (Fiser & Aslin, 2002) or anticipatory eye movements (Marcus, Karatekin, & 124 
Markiewicz, 2006) and participants are usually unaware of the subtle changes in their own 125 
behavior as a result of learning. On the other hand, SL can also result in explicit knowledge 126 
about what was learned (Bertels, Franco, & Destrebecqz, 2012; Esser & Haider, 2017b). 127 
Explicit learning is typically measured by recognition or recall which requires “conscious, or 128 
deliberate, access to memory for previous experiences” (Gomez, 1997, p. 166). In the current 129 
study, we assessed multiple measures of learning to explore how the learned information is 130 
transferred into behavior. If participants learned the statistical regularities, they could in 131 
principle predict what would occur next and shift their gaze to the next event in the sequence. 132 
If implicit knowledge from observation can be accessed and used to modify behavior, 133 
participants could also reproduce the observed regularities and report knowledge about the 134 
sequence structure.  135 
1.3 The role of the motor system during action observation 136 
Observing actions engages neural networks that differ from those involved in general 137 
visual and attention processes (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Ahlheim et al., 2014; 138 
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Schubotz & von Cramon, 2009). For instance, neuroimaging research has revealed the 139 
existence of a network of sensorimotor brain regions, collectively termed ‘action-observation 140 
network’ (AON), which are specifically engaged when observing another person’s actions 141 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Kilner, 2011). Activity in the AON, also sometimes termed 142 
‘motor resonance’ (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) or ‘simulation’ (Blakemore & Decety, 143 
2001), is thought to facilitate prediction of observed actions by simulating how one would 144 
perform the action oneself. Predictive accounts of the motor system propose that we employ 145 
our own motor system using an internal, feed-forward model to predict the behavior of other 146 
people we observe (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007b).  147 
In the context of embodied accounts of action observation, the motor system 148 
facilitates efficient transformation of visual information into action knowledge in the 149 
observer’s motor system. Supporting evidence from a separate line of research on 150 
observational learning shows that observers are consistently better at imitating and learning 151 
novel tool functions when observing a human actor relative to any other form of visual 152 
observation (for a review, see Hopper, 2010). These behavioral studies employed the use of a 153 
so-called ‘ghost display’, a method in which objects appear to move on their own with no 154 
agent intervention. In the current study, we adopted the ghost-display method to test the 155 
hypothesis that the learning advantage when observing another human, relative to a non-156 
agent ghost display, extends to action predictions based on statistical learning.  157 
1.4 The role of effects in continuous action sequences 158 
Goal-directed actions typically result in perceivable effects, such as the sound of a 159 
whistle as it is blown. Through repeated observation, these effects become linked to the 160 
actions that consistently precede them and create ‘bidirectional action-effect associations’ 161 
(Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Prior research suggests that it is the effects of actions themselves 162 
that people anticipate when planning their own movements (Hommel, 1996). In the field of 163 
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implicit learning research, action-effects have been shown to enhance implicit sequence 164 
learning when participants own motor responses result in predictable action-effects (e.g., 165 
Haider, Eberhardt, Esser, & Rose, 2014). Recent work suggests that they may also be 166 
particularly important for transferring learning from implicit into explicit awareness (Esser & 167 
Haider, 2017a, 2017b). These findings demonstrate that action-effect associations likely play 168 
a central role in establishing the contextual knowledge needed for making action predictions. 169 
Though much of this work has investigated action-effects in sequence learning of motor 170 
responses (e.g., using the standard serial reaction time task), there is also evidence to suggest 171 
that action-effects also guide our predictions during observation alone (Paulus, van Dam, 172 
Hunnius, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2011). 173 
How do sensory effects influence observers’ sensitivity to statistical regularities when 174 
they are embedded within continuous sequences, as is the case during daily real-life 175 
perception? Based on ideomotor theory (James, 1890) and the related action-effect principle 176 
(Hommel, 1996), observers should be better at learning action contingencies when they are 177 
paired with an effect even when they do not produce the effects themselves. A matter that has 178 
not received much attention, however, is the fact that non-action visual events also result in 179 
sensory effects, such as a crashing wave. So far, we have defined effects as action-effects to 180 
be consistent with prior research, but it is possible that sensory effects lead to similar 181 
bidirectional associations in any form of perceptual sequence. In fact, another recent theory 182 
(Schubotz, 2007) suggests that prediction of sensory effects occurs within our sensorimotor 183 
system and can be generalized to any form of perceptual event, whether action or not. On the 184 
other hand, as we described above, evidence for enhanced learning from observing action 185 
suggests action-effects should be perceived and learned qualitatively differently than the 186 
effects of non-action perceptual events. In the current study, we manipulated whether 187 
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statistical regularities were paired with an action-effect to investigate the importance of 188 
observed effects for action predictions.  189 
1.5 The current experiment 190 
The central focus of this study was to investigate whether observers spontaneously 191 
exploit statistical information in continuous action sequences to predict upcoming actions. 192 
Our experiment included two manipulations in order to target two primary components of 193 
action processing: (a) the role of observing an actors versus a ghost display (Agent and Ghost 194 
conditions; between-subjects), and (b) the influence of action effects versus lack of effects 195 
(Effect and No-effect pairs; within-subjects). These were assessed using an anticipatory 196 
fixation eye-tracking paradigm during action observation, which has been established as a 197 
measure of visual predictions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). In addition, we examined the 198 
link between predictive looking during observation and subsequent action production. For 199 
this third aim, post-observation action performance and verbal reports were analyzed as 200 
complementary measures of implicit and explicit learning.  201 
2.0 Method 202 
2.1 Participants 203 
Fifty university students participated in this study (25 in each condition [Agent and 204 
Ghost]; 43 females; M = 20.07 years, range = 18-25 years, SD = 2.29). Participants were 205 
recruited via an online system for students at the university and were awarded course credit 206 
for participation. Seven participants were excluded from analyses for not meeting the 207 
inclusion requirements for total looking time (see Analysis section), resulting in 43 208 
participants in the final sample (23 in the Agent condition and 20 in the Ghost condition).  209 
2.2 Stimuli  210 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded with a Tobii T60 eye-tracker (Tobii, 211 
Stockholm, Sweden) with a 17” monitor. Participants sat approximately 60cm away from the 212 
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screen. Stimuli were presented with Tobii ClearView AVI presentation software and sounds 213 
were played through external speakers.  214 
Participants observed a full-screen (1280x1024 pixels) film of a sequence involving a 215 
multi-object device that afforded six unique manipulations and a central, star-shaped light 216 
(Figure 1). To avoid confusion, we will subsequently refer to the individual object 217 
manipulations in the sequence as ‘events’, as in one condition they were human actions and 218 
in the other they were object movements. The movies were filmed with a Sony HandyCam 219 
video camera and edited using Adobe Premiere Pro Cs5 software. The same device used 220 
during filming was presented to participants before and after the observation phase.  221 
 222 
Figure 1. Overview of the experimental design. 223 
A: Example frames from the video stimuli of the Agent condition. B: Schematic illustrating 224 
the deterministic pairs and transitional probabilities within sequences during the observation 225 
phase. 226 
 227 
2.2.1 Sequence   228 
We constructed four pseudo-randomized sequences, using the program Mix (van 229 
Casteren & Davis, 2006). All sequences contained two deterministic pairs (transitional 230 
probability between events = 1.0), labelled ‘Effect’ and ‘No-effect’ pairs (described in more 231 
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detail in the following paragraph). The second event of each deterministic pair was labelled a 232 
target, as these were the events that became predictable as the sequence unfolded. All other 233 
possible random pairs occurred with equal frequency (transitional probabilities between 234 
events = 0.167; Figure 1B). No event or pair could occur more than three times consecutively. 235 
All pairs and random events occurred 12 times (targets thus occurred 12 times within pairs 236 
and 12 times outside of pairs). In total, participants viewed 24 deterministic pairs (12 Effect 237 
and 12 No-effect pairs) and 48 random unpaired events, for sequences of 96 total actions or 238 
events. Effect and No-effect pairs were composed of two actions that were randomly selected 239 
from the 6 possible actions. Two sets of the four sequences were created: the two actions 240 
comprising the Effect pair in one set became the No-effect pair in the second set, and vice-241 
versa. Thus, there were eight possible sequences within each condition and 16 videos in total; 242 
participants were randomly assigned to view one of these videos.  243 
The ‘Effect pair’ caused a central star to light up, whereas the ‘No-effect pair’ caused 244 
no additional effect. We will subsequently refer to the second events of both pairs as targets, 245 
as these were the events that became predictable as the sequence unfolded. The effect onset 246 
occurred at a natural mid-point of the target event during the Effect pair: for example, during 247 
the target open, the light turned on the moment the yellow door was fully open and turned off 248 
again after it closed (see Figure 1A).  249 
Targets could also occur elsewhere in the sequence outside of the deterministic pair 250 
(see Figure 1B). In these instances, the effect never occurred. This ensured that the second 251 
event did not independently predict the effect, and observers were required to learn the two-252 
step pair structure to accurately predict the effect.  253 
Each video sequence was divided into four blocks, with the viewing angle oriented 254 
from a different side of the box for each block. This was to dissociate the events (and their 255 
corresponding objects) with their spatial location, and thus ensure that the observer could not 256 
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predict the next event based on its location on the screen. Each block lasted approximately 257 
90s and consisted of 24 events. Brief cartoon animations were presented between blocks in 258 
order to reengage the participant’s attention. At the beginning of a block, one 4s still frame of 259 
the stimulus was presented to allow observers to reorient to the new perspective. Movies 260 
were approximately seven minutes long. Engaging, upbeat music was played throughout the 261 
entire demonstration that did not correspond in any way to the unfolding sequence. 262 
2.2.2 Agent condition 263 
In the Agent condition movies, a hand manipulated the stimulus objects in a 264 
continuous sequence. For each action, the hand entered the screen closest to the object on 265 
which it acted. Each action was exactly three seconds in duration with a one-second pause 266 
between actions during which the hand was off-screen and only the stimulus was visible. 267 
2.2.3 Ghost condition 268 
In the Ghost condition, the objects appeared to move on their own with a spotlight 269 
focused on the current event (see Figure 2). The spotlight gradually illuminated each object 270 
just prior to its movement onset and faded again after the object ceased moving. Between 271 
ghost events, there was a 1s pause during which it was ambiguous where the spotlight would 272 
next begin to appear, which matched the period of time the actor’s hand was off-screen in the 273 
Agent condition. Like the actor’s hand, the spotlight cued which object would subsequently 274 
move. The intensity and focus of the spotlight was equal for all objects. The sequence order 275 
and timing of events were otherwise identical to the videos in the Agent condition. 276 
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 277 
Figure 2. Predictive time windows in the Agent and Ghost conditions. 278 
Example frames illustrating the predictive time windows in both conditions. Arrows indicate 279 
the first frame in which the agent’s hand appears (Agent condition) and in which the spotlight 280 
focuses onto the target object (Ghost condition). 281 
 282 
2.3 Procedure  283 
Participants were first seated at a table upon which the stimulus device was placed. 284 
The side facing each participant was counterbalanced. Participants were told they would 285 
watch a video of a person interacting with the device, and were allowed to first familiarize 286 
themselves with the objects before beginning the experiment. The side of the object facing 287 
the participant during the action execution phase was kept the same as during the initial 288 
familiarization. After familiarization, participants moved to a chair positioned in front of the 289 
eye-tracking monitor for the observation phase in which they observed the stimuli videos. 290 
First, the eye-tracker was calibrated using a standard 9-point calibration sequence provided 291 
by Tobii Studio software. Calibration was repeated until valid calibration data was acquired 292 
for at least eight calibration points. Following calibration, participants were shown one of the 293 
eight stimulus sequences. They were told that they would be shown a video but were not 294 
given specific viewing instructions.  295 
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Immediately after the observation phase, participants returned to the table and were 296 
told that they could freely interact with the stimulus for one minute (this duration was based 297 
on pilot testing). Participants were given no instruction, as our aim was to investigate whether 298 
they would spontaneously integrate observed regularities into their own actions in the 299 
absence of any task demand. The experimenter sat opposite the participant and monitored 300 
their behavior, pressing a hidden button that activated the effect (i.e., central star light) 301 
whenever he or she performed the Effect pair. After one minute, the experimenter ended the 302 
action execution phase and then asked each participant the following questions: “Do you 303 
know how to make the light turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?” 304 
If participants responded “yes” they were then asked to demonstrate the correct sequence on 305 
the device. A camera facing the participant recorded this session and behavior was later 306 
coded offline to assess action performance. Each participant completed one action sequence. 307 
3.0 Data Analysis 308 
3.1 Eye-tracking data  309 
Participants with total fixation time more than one standard deviation below the mean 310 
were excluded due to relative inattention to the movies. These participants yielded gaze data 311 
for less than 25% of the demonstration, which corresponded to only 3 observations of each 312 
pair and was insufficient to assess learning over the course of the experiment. This resulted in 313 
the exclusion of two participants in the Agent condition and five participants in the Ghost 314 
condition (see Participants section above).  315 
Eye movement data was exported from Tobii ClearView analysis software and 316 
separated into discrete fixations using a customized software program with a spatial filter of 317 
30 pixels and a temporal filter of 100ms. Fixation data was imported into Matlab for further 318 
analysis. Regions of interest (ROI) of identical size were defined around each object 319 
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(250x250 square pixels), and a smaller ROI (130x130 square pixels) was defined around the 320 
light (due to its smaller size relative to the objects).  321 
For the Agent condition, fixations were considered predictive if they occurred in the 322 
time window from when the actor’s hand entered the screen to perform the first action of a 323 
pair until the frame before it reappeared for the target action (Figure 2). This corresponds to 324 
the time in which the participant had enough information to predict the next action before its 325 
onset. For the Ghost condition, this time window was defined from the moment the spotlight 326 
highlighted the first object until the frame before the light shifted towards the second object 327 
of a pair. Time windows were identical in length in both conditions. As the main aim of this 328 
study was to examine prediction, only predictive gaze fixations were included in our analyses 329 
(i.e., we did not examine reactive fixations). 330 
To assess predictive gaze during observation, we compared proportions of fixations to 331 
correct vs. incorrect objects (Implicit learning measure I). Implicit learning measure I reflects 332 
the extent to which observers predict the correct location of an upcoming event, relative to 333 
other locations. Second, we analyzed proportions of correct predictive fixations over the 334 
course of the experiment to examine how learning unfolded over time. Third, proportions of 335 
predictive fixations to target objects were compared between deterministic and random 336 
transitions (Implicit learning measure II). Learning measure II reflects the frequency of 337 
predictive looks to the target actions during predictable relative to non-predictable trials. We 338 
describe both measures in more detail below (Figure 3). 339 
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 340 
Figure 3. Overview of the experimental design and dependent variables. 341 
 342 
3.1.1 Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations 343 
Target regions were defined around the location of the second events of each pair. 344 
Fixations to targets during predictive time windows were counted as Correct and fixations to 345 
the four remaining objects as Incorrect. Objects currently being manipulated (i.e., the first 346 
action of the pair) were excluded from analyses. The first trial of each pair was not analyzed, 347 
because participants were not expected to correctly predict the first observation of a pair. If 348 
participants learned the pair structure, we expected them to make more fixations to the 349 
locations of target objects relative to any other object during predictive time windows. For 350 
both Effect and No-effect pairs, we calculated the proportion of correct and incorrect 351 
fixations out of the total fixations to all objects (Eqs. 1 and 2). Because there were uneven 352 
numbers of correct and incorrect locations, the incorrect proportion was defined as the 353 
average number of fixations to the four remaining objects out of the total number of fixations. 354 
This location measure represents observers’ bias for looking toward the correct target, 355 
relative to other objects, before it was acted upon. For additional analyses in which we 356 
included fixations to the action-effect, see Supplementary Materials.   357 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  
# 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 
     ( 1 ) 358 
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𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  
# 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 4 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠/4
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 
    ( 2 ) 359 
3.1.2 Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions 360 
Our second learning measure compared fixations to targets during deterministic vs. 361 
random trials (Eqs. 3 and 4). Random trials were defined as transitions between any possible 362 
event and the subsequent occurrence of a target event outside of a deterministic pair. We 363 
discarded all repetition trials (for example, push followed by push) because it was impossible 364 
to determine whether fixations during these trials were predictive or reactive (i.e., simply not 365 
moving the eyes). This analysis thus enabled us to compare fixations to the same location 366 
(target objects) in different statistical contexts. 367 
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐2 =  
# 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
  ( 3 ) 368 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 =  
# 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
   ( 4 ) 369 
3.2 Behavioral data 370 
3.2.1 Explicit learning measure I: Action performance  371 
Participants’ self-produced action sequences were coded from the videotape 372 
recordings. Each object manipulation was counted as a single action. We calculated the 373 
conditional probability of performing the second action of a pair (B), given performance of 374 
the first action (A), to account for variation in the overall length of participants’ sequences. 375 
Conditional probability was defined as: 376 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) =  
𝑃(𝐴,𝐵)
𝑃(𝐴)
     ( 5 ) 377 
3.2.2 Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses 378 
Responses to the experimenters’ explicit questions—“Do you know how to make the 379 
light turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?”—were coded as yes or 380 
                                                          
2 Note that this equation is identical to Eq. 1 
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no; if their response was yes, it was further coded as ‘yes’-correct or ‘yes’-incorrect 381 
depending on whether or not they demonstrated the correct sequence on the first attempt. 382 
Proportions of participants who indicated each response type were calculated for each pair, 383 
per condition.  384 
4.0 Results 385 
4.1 Eye movement data 386 
To examine whether the Agent and Ghost displays elicited similar rates of overall 387 
visual attention to the objects of interest, we compared the number of predictive fixations 388 
between the two conditions. There were no differences in the number of anticipatory fixations 389 
made during target trials (Ghost = 41.55, SEM = 4.80; Agent: M = 44.61, SEM = 3.41; p = .60) 390 
or in the total number of fixations made across the entire demonstration (p = .21) suggesting 391 
that differences in the visual stimuli in the Agent and Ghost conditions did not underlie any 392 
potential differences in anticipatory fixations. Analyses of total looking times in seconds are 393 
reported in the Supplementary materials. 394 
4.1.1 Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations 395 
Our primary learning measures in each condition are presented in Table 1. 396 
Proportions of gaze fixations were analyzed via a repeated-measure ANOVA with Prediction 397 
(Correct vs. Incorrect) and Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as within-subject factors and Condition 398 
(Agent vs. Ghost) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of 399 
Prediction, indicating that participants made a higher proportion of correct relative to 400 
incorrect predictive fixations across pairs (mean difference = .14 [SEM = .04], F(1,40) = 401 
16.27, p < .001, p2 = .29). There were no other significant main effects or interactions 402 
(ps > .13). The results of additional analyses including the location of the action-effect as a 403 
correct location are available in the Supplemental Information.  404 
 405 
Action Prediction     18 
 
 406 
 407 
 408 
Table 1.  409 
Main implicit and explicit dependent measures, separated by condition.    410 
      Agent (N = 23) Ghost (N = 20) 
Learning 
measure Pair   Mean  SD Mean SD 
I: Correct vs. 
Incorrect 
Effect Correct (Eq. 1) 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.33 
 Incorrect (Eq. 2) 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 
No-effect Correct (Eq. 1) 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.22 
  Incorrect (Eq. 2) 0.19 0.07 0.19 0.06 
II: Deterministic 
vs. Random 
Effect Deterministic (Eq. 3) 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.33 
 Random (Eq. 4) 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.16 
No-effect Deterministic (Eq. 3) 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.22 
  Random (Eq. 4) 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Action 
Performance 
Effect Conditional 
probability (Eq. 5)  
0.54 0.36 0.30 0.30 
No-effect 0.29 0.36 0.09 0.16 
Verbal Response 
(“yes” – correct)  
Effect 
% participants 
68.4% 15.4% 
No-effect 5.9% 7.7% 
Note. For learning measure I, column 3 refers to proportions of correct and incorrect fixations. For learning 411 
measure II, column 3 refers to proportions of correct fixations on deterministic or random trials. 412 
 413 
4.1.2 Learning over trials 414 
To examine changes in predictions across trials, we performed a general estimating 415 
equations (GEE) analysis. GEE analyses are a preferred method for analyzing data with 416 
repeated measures that contain missing points, such as trials in which no anticipatory 417 
fixations were recorded, because they do not apply list-wise exclusion of cases (Zeger, Liang, 418 
& Albert, 1988). Proportions of correct fixations to the targets were entered as the dependent 419 
variable in a linear, model-based GEE with an unstructured Working Correlation Matrix. 420 
Condition (between-subjects), Trial (within-subjects), and Pair (within-subjects) were entered 421 
as predictors in a factorial model. In this analysis, the first trial was included (in contrast to 422 
Learning measures I and II). 423 
The GEE analysis yielded significant main effects of Trial (χ2(11) = 47.19, p < .001) 424 
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and Pair (χ2(2) = 26.89, p < .001) a significant interaction between Condition and Trial 425 
(χ2(11) = 21.52, p = .028) a significant interaction between Condition and Pair (χ2(2) = 8.70, 426 
p = .003) and a three-way Condition by Trial by Pair interaction (χ2(11) = 22.96, p = .02). 427 
The Condition by Pair interaction revealed that proportions of correct fixations were 428 
significantly greater in the Agent relative to the Ghost condition for the Effect pair (mean 429 
difference = .18 [SEM = .05], p < .001) but not for the No-effect pair (mean difference = -.09 430 
[SEM = .06], p = .11)3. As illustrated in Figure 4, the Condition by Trial interaction revealed 431 
that the Agent and Ghost conditions did not differ from one another on the very first (p = .45) 432 
or second trial (p = .15). By the third trial, participants in the Agent condition made more 433 
correct fixations than in the Ghost condition (mean difference = .28 [SEM = .12], p = .015) 434 
and this pattern continued for several trials. The two conditions converged again by the 6th 435 
trial (p = .53) for the remainder of the experiment.  Together, these findings suggest that 436 
participants showed a selective learning benefit for making correct anticipations when 437 
viewing an agent producing action-effects, relative to the other observation contexts. 438 
439 
                                                          
3 Note that the interaction between Condition and Pair was not statistically significant in our first analysis (4.1.1). 
This is likely due to the fact that the first analysis included both correct and incorrect fixations, whereas the 
Learning over Trials analysis examines correct fixations only. 
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Figure 4. Learning over time. 440 
Estimated marginal means of correct predictive fixations across pairs as a function of trial, 441 
(left) collapsed across pairs and (right) separated by Effect and No-effect pairs. Bars 442 
represent standard errors. 443 
 444 
4.1.3 Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions 445 
The proportion of gaze fixations to target objects (Eqs. 3 and 4) were entered as the 446 
dependent variables into an ANOVA with Transition (Deterministic vs. Random) and Pair 447 
(Effect vs. No-effect) as within-subjects factors and Condition (Agent vs. Ghost) as a 448 
between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of Transition, showing that participants 449 
made more target fixations during deterministic than during random transitions across 450 
conditions and pairs, F(1, 42) = 42.9, p < .001, p2 = .51. There were no other effects or 451 
interactions (ps > .11). 452 
4.2 Explicit measures of learning 453 
4.2.1 Explicit learning measure I: Action performance 454 
Across conditions, participants performed sequences with an average length of 26.22 455 
actions (SD = 7.1), and performed a mean of 2.12 Effect pairs and 0.64 No-effect pairs (see 456 
Table 1 for additional descriptive measures). There were no differences in the total length of 457 
action sequences performed between conditions (p = .19).  458 
Conditional probabilities for performing the target action given the performance of 459 
the first action of the pair were entered in an ANOVA with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as a 460 
within-subjects factor and Condition (Agent vs. Ghost) as a between-subjects factor. This 461 
revealed main effects of Condition and Pair: participants in the Agent condition were more 462 
likely to perform an action pair than those in the Ghost condition, F(1, 34) = 11.57, p = .002, 463 
ηp2 = .25 (see Figure 5a). Across conditions, participants were more likely to perform the 464 
Effect pair than the No-effect pair, F(1, 34) = 8.25, p = .007, ηp2 = .20. There was no 465 
interaction between Pair and Condition (p = .78).  466 
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To assess whether participants in each group performed more pairs than would be 467 
expected by chance, we conducted a one-sample t-test to compare the mean conditional 468 
probability of performing each pair against a chance level of 0.167 (one out of six possible 469 
actions, given any previous action). This revealed that the participants in the Agent condition 470 
performed Effect pairs significantly more than chance (p < .001), while participants in the 471 
Ghost condition did not (p = .13). In neither condition were the No-effect pairs performed at 472 
an above-chance level (ps > .05). 473 
 474 
Figure 5. Action performance and verbal awareness. 475 
A: The mean probability of performing Effect and No-effect pairs (P(B|A)). Bars represent 476 
standard errors. B: Scatterplot illustrating the relation between predictive fixations (Eq. 1) 477 
and action performance (Eq. 5) for the Effect pair, across conditions. C: Pie graphs showing 478 
the percentage of participants who gave each response type to the experimenter’s question. 479 
For the Effect pair, this was “Do you know how the light turns on?” and for the No-effect 480 
pair this was “Did you see any other pattern in the movies?”  481 
 482 
To investigate whether action execution was related to anticipatory looking behavior, 483 
we correlated the proportion of correct target fixations (Eq. 1) and the conditional probability 484 
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of producing action pairs for each pair type. Across conditions, there was a significant 485 
positive correlation between target fixations during Effect pairs and the conditional 486 
probability of producing Effect pairs, r(35) = .41, p = .02, indicating that participants who 487 
demonstrated higher rates of learning during the observation phase were more likely to 488 
reenact the action-effect during the subsequent behavioral session (Figure 5b). There was no 489 
correlation for the No-effect pair, r(36) = .01, p = .97. These correlation coefficients differed 490 
significantly from one another, Z = 1.75, p = .044. 491 
4.2.2 Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses 492 
Figure 5c illustrates the distributions of participants per each explicit response type to 493 
the experimenter’s questions following the action execution phase, separated by pair and 494 
condition. The pie charts reflect the following pattern: 94.7% of participants in the Agent 495 
condition reported explicit knowledge of the Effect pair; of these, 72.2% were correct and 496 
27.8% were incorrect. Only 53.8% reported explicit knowledge of the pair in the Ghost 497 
condition; 28.6% of these were correct and 71.4% were incorrect. Further, only 40% reported 498 
knowledge of the No-effect pair across conditions, and those who did were usually incorrect 499 
(93.3% of these 40%).     500 
To compare these proportions of participants (Agent vs. Ghost) to one another, we 501 
calculated the confidence intervals of the difference between them (the difference between 502 
proportions is statistically significant wherever the confidence interval excludes zero; 503 
Newcombe, 1998; Wilson, 1927). Table 2 reports the confidence intervals for the differences 504 
in proportions for each response type. For the Effect pair, the proportion of participants who 505 
responded ‘yes’ and were correct was significantly greater in the Agent than the Ghost 506 
                                                          
4 For thoroughness, we also averaged across pairs and correlated the fixation proportions with conditional 
probability for Agent and Ghost conditions separately. Across pairs, there were no significant correlations for 
either group, ps > .42. These correlation coefficients did not differ significantly from one another (Z = .41, p 
= .34). 
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condition. A higher proportion of participants in the Agent condition reported knowledge of 507 
the Effect pair—and could demonstrate the correct sequence—than in the Ghost condition. 508 
Likewise, significantly more participants in the Ghost condition reported no knowledge of the 509 
Effect pair than in the Agent condition. For the No-effect pair, the pattern of responses was 510 
similar across conditions. Thus, participants observing an actor were more likely to retain 511 
precise knowledge they could verbalize about the pair structure, but only when the actor’s 512 
actions led to a causal effect. Participants observing ghost events were less likely to report 513 
verbal knowledge, and when they did, their representations of the pair structure were more 514 
likely to be inaccurate. 515 
Table 2.  516 
Mean differences (and confidence intervals) between conditions (Agent – Ghost) in the 517 
proportions of participants reporting each response type for Effect and No-effect pairs. 518 
 
Effect Pair No effect Pair 
Response Diff(Pa-Pb) 95% CI Diff(Pa-Pb) 95% CI 
"No" -.41 [.11, .66]* .11 [-.22, .41] 
"Yes"-correct .53 [.18, .73]* -.02 [-.20, .28] 
"Yes"-incorrect -.12 [-.18, .42] -.09 [-.22, .40] 
Note. Diff(Pa-Pb) indicates the difference between the proportions of participants in the Agent and Ghost 519 
conditions. *denotes statistically significant difference between the two sample proportions (p < .05). 520 
 521 
5.0 Discussion 522 
The current study investigated whether observers can learn statistical regularities 523 
during observation of continuous action or event sequences. Specifically, we measured 524 
anticipatory gaze fixations as an implicit measure of whether participants could use statistical 525 
information to predict upcoming actions or events in the sequence. After learning, we 526 
measured spontaneous action performance and verbal reports as explicit measures of whether 527 
observed statistical regularities influence participants’ self-produced actions and knowledge 528 
of the sequence.  529 
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5.1 Implicit learning: Predictive gaze  530 
Across conditions and pairs, participants demonstrated a robust tendency to predict 531 
correct relative to incorrect locations. They also predicted the target more frequently during 532 
deterministic relative to random transitions between events. In other words, they looked to 533 
where a target event was statistically likely to occur next, and they looked to the targets 534 
selectively when they were likely to occur next relative to when they were unlikely to occur 535 
next.  536 
When examining correct predictions over time, an interaction effect between these 537 
two manipulations emerged: participants appeared to learn the regularities best when they 538 
observed an actor produce an action-effect. In addition, different patterns emerged between 539 
the Agent and Ghost conditions for implicit and explicit learning outcomes, as measured by 540 
visual anticipations, action performance, and verbal knowledge of the pair structure. 541 
Specifically, observing actions in the Agent condition did not seem to uniquely benefit 542 
predictive gaze performance relative to observing visual events in the Ghost condition; 543 
however, it did increase reproduction of the action pair and verbal knowledge about the pair 544 
structure. Importantly, these differences were apparent only for the sequence pair which 545 
resulted in an action-effect. One explanation for these patterns is that action-specific 546 
processing in the Agent condition facilitated transfer from implicit (i.e., eye movements) to 547 
explicit (i.e., self-produced actions, verbal awareness) knowledge, as we discuss in the 548 
following sections.  549 
5.2 Actions versus perceptual sequences  550 
Participants demonstrated learning both when observing an actor and ghost events, as 551 
indicated by their correct predictive looks while observing the sequences in both conditions. 552 
This finding suggests that statistical learning operates consistently across the different types 553 
of perceptual events, both action and non-action. Interestingly, learning emerged earlier in the 554 
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Agent condition than in the Ghost condition. Consistent with prior research, this finding 555 
reveals a subtle learning benefit when observing an agent relative to other forms of visual 556 
displays (Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010; Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 557 
2015). According to motor-based accounts of action observation, this benefit originates from 558 
internal predictive models based in the motor system (Kilner et al., 2007; Stapel, Hunnius, 559 
Meyer, & Bekkering, 2016). Here we show that observers demonstrate faster learning in the 560 
Agent condition relative to the Event condition. Specifically, participants’ rates of correct 561 
fixations to target actions increased more quickly in the Agent condition, revealing that they 562 
more easily detected the statistical relations between the actions and could modify their 563 
looking behavior accordingly. Interpreted within these motor-based accounts, this may reflect 564 
a more efficient ability to transfer knowledge acquired from visual statistical learning into 565 
action predictions that are generated in the motor system (Kilner, 2009).  566 
As discussed in the introduction, developmental studies have shown that children 567 
learn significantly better from observing an agent performing actions relative to other forms 568 
of observational learning (Hopper, 2010). One recent study, in fact, showed that toddlers 569 
were able to learn action sequences when observing an actor, but not ghost events (Monroy, 570 
Gerson, & Hunnius, 2017). This finding may reflect an interesting developmental shift, in 571 
which actions provide a unique context that helps infants and children use acquired 572 
knowledge from statistical learning to make predictions, above and beyond other stimuli. 573 
Adults, on the other hand, are able to employ their statistical learning abilities across action 574 
and non-actions contexts. Nevertheless, observing actions seems to elicit a learning benefit 575 
that is consistent across development.  576 
Though we made every attempt to match the stimuli in the two conditions for saliency, 577 
there could have still been perceptual differences between the Agent and Ghost conditions 578 
that could alternatively explain our findings. However, perceptual differences cannot solely 579 
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explain the observed results, as we find no differences in overall visual attention or predictive 580 
fixations between conditions during observation. Secondly, both conditions demonstrated 581 
learning during observation, but those in the Agent condition specifically reproduced more 582 
action pairs and acquired more explicit sequence knowledge than participants in the Ghost 583 
condition. This finding suggests that there were qualitative differences in the way the 584 
sequence information was learned in Agent condition that are unlikely to be a result of 585 
perceptual saliency. 586 
5.3 The role of effects 587 
Observing an agent produce causal effects led to higher rates of verbal knowledge and 588 
reproduction of the action pair, relative to observing the ghost events or the pairs with no 589 
effect (both action and ghost). This pattern supports the interpretation that observing actions 590 
primarily influences the way in which learned knowledge is subsequently used to modify 591 
behavior. Even though participants were uninstructed, observing an actor produce an effect in 592 
the world may have automatically induced participants to perceive these events as goal-593 
directed, and to attempt to re-create them in the test setting. An alternative explanation, 594 
suggestive of lower-level accounts, is that the action-effect simply provides additional 595 
information and is therefore easier to learn. The action-effect relation contains more 596 
information (i.e., A predicts both B and C) than the action-only pair (A predicts B). In 597 
addition, the action-effect contingency contains an additional dimension (i.e., actions and 598 
effects versus only actions). According to the model of sequence learning given by Keele and 599 
colleagues (2003), multidimensional learning requires additional attention components that 600 
are not required during unidimensional learning. These attentional requirements enhance 601 
sequence learning by making the learned information accessible to explicit awareness (Keele, 602 
Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003).  603 
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When only analyzing correct predictions over time, an interaction effect emerged 604 
which revealed that participants in the Agent condition demonstrated more correct predictive 605 
fixations for the Effect relative to the No-effect pair, whereas this pattern did not hold for the 606 
participants in the Ghost condition. However, this interaction effect did not appear when 607 
comparing fixations to both correct and incorrect locations. One possible explanation for this 608 
inconsistency is that, in the absence of a visual effect, participants were free to engage in 609 
more visual exploratory behaviors to the other objects, resulting in higher proportions of 610 
incorrect fixations for the No-effect pair relative to the Effect pair.  611 
5.4 Action performance and its relation to prediction 612 
Across conditions, participants were more likely to reproduce the pair associated with 613 
an effect than the pair without an effect. In addition, rates of performing the effect pair were 614 
correlated with participants’ predictive looking for this pair. Specifically, the more accurately 615 
observers predicted the Effect pair, the more likely they were to reproduce the effect 616 
following observation. Adults and children easily recreate effects that they see in the world 617 
when explicitly asked to do so; this has been empirically demonstrated in both forced-choice 618 
and free-choice designs for simple action-effect contingencies (Elsner, 2007; Elsner & 619 
Hommel, 2001). Here, our results provide new evidence that observers could recreate action-620 
effects based only on learning transitional probabilities, and they did so in the absence of 621 
instruction or any explicit task. These findings suggest that new action knowledge—acquired 622 
via observational statistical learning—can be accessed and used for action control when the 623 
learned actions are used for produced a desired effect or outcome.  624 
In addition, participants in the Agent condition were more likely to reproduce action 625 
pairs than participants in the Ghost condition. This was not due to a general difference in 626 
activity between the two conditions, as they did not simply perform more actions overall. 627 
Based on the idea that we naturally tend to perceive human behavior as goal-directed, 628 
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observers in the Agent condition may have automatically attributed meaning to the actor’s 629 
actions and were more motivated to imitate what they observed, especially when they 630 
resulted in an effect (Hopper, 2010; Hopper et al., 2014). Alternatively, consistent with the 631 
faster emergence of correct anticipations in the Agent condition, these participants may have 632 
also been better able to retain the new knowledge gained from the observed sequence and 633 
apply it when performing their own action sequences than those in the Ghost condition.  634 
5.5 Relations between predictive gaze, action performance, and verbal knowledge 635 
Whether statistical learning engages implicit or explicit processes—and whether the 636 
resulting knowledge is also implicit or explicit—is an ongoing debate (see Daltrozzo & 637 
Conway, 2014 for a review). In the current study, we measured predictive gaze, action 638 
performance, and verbal responses as reflecting different learning outcomes. These behaviors 639 
may also relate to varying levels of implicit and explicit knowledge of the learned structure. 640 
Studies on SL typically demonstrate that the outcomes of learning, and thus the learning 641 
processes, are manifested in implicit behaviors such as anticipatory gaze, if at all (Fiser & 642 
Aslin, 2001; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Turk-Browne et al., 2008). Currently, there is a 643 
divide between those who argue that SL is an implicit mechanism (e.g., Clegg, DiGirolamo, 644 
& Keele, 1998) and those who suggest that the process may be implicit but the knowledge 645 
obtained via SL can become explicit when, for instance, learning reaches a certain threshold 646 
(Cleeremans, 2006). In the former case, it is argued that knowledge can only become explicit 647 
when other cognitive systems come into play. Recent findings have shown that sequence 648 
learning also results in explicit knowledge depending on the ‘task set’; that is, the relation 649 
between the stimulus characteristics and the required response of the learner (Esser & Haider, 650 
2017a, 2017b). 651 
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Consistent with these recent findings, our data suggest that observing action 652 
sequences results in both implicit and explicit learning outcomes5. One possibility, grounded 653 
in predictive accounts of the motor system, is that the knowledge gained via statistical 654 
learning can be accessed by the motor system and used to update internal action models. 655 
These models serve to generate predictions about the most likely upcoming action and to 656 
prepare appropriate motor responses. Our findings differ from prior research in that, in the 657 
current experiment, no response was required from participants during observation. Thus, the 658 
resulting explicit knowledge did not arise from learned stimulus-response associations (as in 659 
Haider et al., 2014). Rather, observation alone was sufficient to elicit both implicit and 660 
explicit knowledge. Further, our findings suggest that observing human actions facilitates 661 
both implicit sequence learning (indicated by faster learning rates in the Agent condition) and 662 
transferring learned knowledge into explicit responses. However, as suggested by Schubotz 663 
(2007), motor-based learning and prediction can still occur for external events (i.e., non-664 
actions). A fascinating question for further research is whether observing action sequences 665 
engages entirely distinct learning processes from other forms of observational learning, or 666 
whether the difference mainly lies in how the knowledge is accessed and used. Another 667 
possibility to be considered is that acting immediately prior to being questioned by the 668 
experimenter may have influenced some participants’ verbal knowledge. That is, action 669 
performance may have helped them to verbalize knowledge that otherwise would have 670 
remained implicit. However, if there was an effect of acting on participants’ explicit 671 
knowledge of the sequence, this should have been consistent across conditions. Instead, the 672 
dramatic group differences in verbal knowledge that we observed suggest that responses were 673 
                                                          
5As we did not directly measure the learning processes, but rather the learning outcomes, we cannot speak to 
whether or not the learning processes themselves were implicit or explicit and focus our discussion on the 
outcomes of learning. 
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primarily influenced by the action observation condition, rather than their own action 674 
production.  675 
5.6 Conclusion 676 
The current study investigated whether SL abilities can support online prediction 677 
during action observation. In particular, we compared observers’ sensitivity to statistical 678 
regularities in action sequences when observing a human actor relative to visual events. Our 679 
main finding revealed that implicit learning occurred in both observation conditions and was 680 
not dependent on action-effects; however, explicit knowledge was only consistently extracted 681 
when observers viewed a human actor perform action sequences with causal effects. These 682 
findings shed light on the potential role of the motor system in enhancing how information 683 
learned solely via observation can be accessed and used to modify behavior. 684 
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